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Extant   provisions   of   Nigeria’s   presidential   constitution   seek   to   promote   a   culture   of  
accountability   through  a  system  of  checks  and  balances.  Since  Nigeria’s   return   to  civil   rule   in  
May  1999,  promotion  of  good  governance  through  accountability  government  continues  to  be  a  
challenge.   All   indications   point   to   a   worsening   governance   crisis   in   the   midst   of   abundant  
resources.   Besides,   Nigeria’s   socio-­economic   performance   and   visible   poor   service   delivery  
depict  a  deepening  governance  crisis  occasioned  by  mismanagement  of  public  resources.  The  
data  collected  by  means  of  documents  and  literature  indicates  that  the  presidential  system  has  
checks  and  balances  as  measures   to  prevent   the  abuse  of  power.   Impeachment   is   the  major  
institutionally  recognised   legislative  mechanism  to  hold   the  executive  accountable.  The  puzzle  
since   the   inception  of  Nigeria’s  Fourth  Republic   is   the   failure  of   the   legislature   to  appropriate  
this  statutory  authority  to  police  the  execution  of  public  policies  in  a  manner  that  will  conform  to  
the  constitutional  requirements.  While  there  are  requisite  constitutional  provisions  that  mandate  
the  legislature  to  ascertain  its  power  over  the  executive,  indicating  Nigeria’s  commitment  to  the  
promotion   of   good   governance,   the   legislature   has   failed   to   appropriate   these   instruments   to  
stimulate   a   responsible   government   that   is   open   to   promoting   good   governance.   Using   the  
theories   of   structural   functionalism  and   elites,   this   paper   argues   that   this   legislative   failure   to  
appropriate  the  instrument  of  impeachment  to  instil  the  culture  of  responsible  executive  in  policy  
process   engenders   the   prevailing   governance   crisis   in   Nigeria.   The   paper   concludes   that   a  
political   system   where   systemic   corruption   prevails   will   reduce   impeachment   to   a   mere  
instrument  of  political  vendetta.  
 




Disposições   existentes   na   constituição   presidencialista   da   Nigéria   procuram   promover   uma  
cultura  de  responsabilidade  através  de  um  sistema  que  permite  escrutinar  o  executivo.  Desde  o  
retorno  da  Nigéria   para  um  governo   civil   em  Maio  de  1999,   a  promoção  de  boa  governação  
através   de   prestação   de   contas   continua   a   ser   um   desafio.   Todas   indicações   apontam   para  
uma  crise  de  governação  piora  no  meio  de  recursos  abundantes.  Para  além  da  fraca  prestação  
de  serviços  públicos,  o  desempenho  sócio-­económico  e  visivelmente  pobre,  representam  uma  
crise  de  governação  ocasionada  com  má  
gestão  dos  recursos  públicos.  Dados  documentais  indicam  que  o  sistema  presidencialista  tem  freios  e  contrapesos  
como  medidas  para  prevenir  o  abuso  de  poder.  Impeachment  é  o  principal  mecanismo  legislativo  institucionalmente  
reconhecido  para  responsabilizar  o  executivo.   
O  grande  desafio  que  se  enfrenta,  desde  o  início  da  Quarta  República  da  Nigéria,  é  a  incapacidade  do  legislador  
em  adoptar  meditadas  estatutárias  para  policiar  a  execução  de  políticas  públicas  de  uma  maneira  que  estará  em  
conformidade   com   a   constituição.   Embora   existam   disposições   constitucionais   necessárias   que   conferem   à  
legislatura  com  o  poder  de  escrutinar  o  executivo,  não  tem  havido  medidas  adequadas,   tomadas  para  promover  a  
cultura  de  boa  governação.  Usando  as  teorias  do  funcionalismo  estrutural  e  elites,  este  artigo  argumenta  que  essa  
falha   legislativa   apropria-­se   do   instrumento   de   impeachment   para   incutir   a   cultura   do   executivo   responsável   no  
processo   político   gera   a   crise   de   governação   na   Nigéria.   O   documento   conclui   que   um   sistema   político   onde   a  
corrupção  sistêmica  prevalece  irá  reduzir  impeachment  a  um  mero  instrumento  de  vingança  política.  
 




Nigeria   returned   to   civil   rule   in   May   1999   after   a   long   period   of   military   dictatorship1.   Following   the   acrimonious  
relationship  that  characterised  the  operation  of   the  Westminster  parliamentary  system  in  the  First  Republic,  Nigeria  
adopted  presidentialism  as   the  governing  system   in   the  Second  Republic,  1979-­1983   (The  Political  Bureau  1987).  
Nevertheless,  the  practice  of  this  new  system  also  attracted  military  intervention  consequent  upon  breakdown  of  law  
and  order  after   the  1983  general  elections   (Ayeni  and  Soremekun  1988;;  Joseph  1991).  The  military   took  over   the  
reins  of  government  on  December  31,  1983  until  May  29,  1999.  Since  1999,  attempts  to  institutionalise  a  culture  of  
accountability  in  government  in  a  system  of  checks  and  balances  continue  to  be  a  challenge.  All  indications  point  to  a  
worsening  governance  crisis  in  the  midst  of  abundant  resources  (Fagbadebo  2007  and  2009).  Constitutional  design  
for  most   presidential   systems   usually   provides  mechanisms   for   checks   and   balances.  Executive   power   controlling  
policy   process   is   often   sandwiched   by   legislative   scrutinising  measures   in   order   to   safeguard   the   interests   of   the  
public  (Turley  1999;;  Bloch  2006).  With  the  principle  of  shared  power  as  well  as  an  independent  base  of  authority,  the  





1   Nigeria  gained  independence  on  October  1,  1960.  A  little  over  five  years,  precisely  on  January  15,  1966,  the  military  took  over  power  in  
a  series  of  coup  d’états.  Though  this  military  interregnum  ended  in  1979,  another  spate  of  military  coup  took  place  from1983  and  kept  





Notionally,   the   legislative   institution   in   Nigeria   occupies   a   prominent   position   as   an   agent   of   accountability.   In  
other  words,  drafters  of  the  constitution  constructed  the  statutory  responsibilities  of  this  political  branch  of  government  
as  a  way  of  guaranteeing  transparency  and  accountability2.  This  branch  of  the  government,  as  in  other  presidential  
systems   (Huneeus   et   al,   2006;;   Hochstetler,   2011),   is   a   principal   actor   in   controlling   the   powers   of   the   executive  
branch  to  achieve  the  desired  objectives  of  the  state.  Section  13  of  the  constitution  states:  
 
It   shall   be   the   duty   and   responsibility   of   all   organs   of   government,   and   of   all   authorities   and  
persons,  exercising  legislative,  executive  or   judicial  powers,  to  conform  to,  observe  and  apply  the  
provisions  of  this  Chapter  of  this  Constitution  (Constitution  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria,  1999  
(as  amended)).  
 
Section  16  (1)  a-­d  specifically  mandates  the  Nigerian  state  to:  
 
(a)  Harness  the  resources  of  the  nation  and  promote  national  prosperity  and  an  efficient,  a  
dynamic  and  self-­reliant  economy;;    
(b)  Control  the  national  economy  in  such  manner  as  to  secure  the  maximum  welfare,  freedom  
and   happiness   of   every   citizen   on   the   basis   of   social   justice   and   equality   of   status   and  
opportunity;;    
(c)  Without  prejudice  to   its  right   to  operate  or  participate   in  areas  of   the  economy,  other   than  
the  major  sectors  of  the  economy  manage  and  operate  the  major  sectors  of  the  economy;;    
(d)  Without  prejudice   to   the   right   of   any  person   to  participate   in  areas  of   the  economy  within   the  
major   sector   of   the   economy,   protect   the   right   of   every   citizen   to   engage   in   any   economic  
activities   outside   the   major   sectors   of   the   economy   (Constitution   of   the   Federal   republic   of  
Nigeria,1999  (as  amended).  
 
Thus,  the  expectation  of  the  Nigerian  constitution  is  that  the  branches  of  government  are  responsible  for  
the  promotion  and  attainment  of  these  objectives  for  the  promotion  of  public  goods.  
To  what  extent  has  the  legislative  branch  in  Nigeria  harnessed  the  requisite  constitutional  instruments  
to  promote  the  culture  of  accountability  in  government  as  envisaged  by  the  constitution?  With  presidential  
system   and   its   safeguard   against   abuse   of   power,   why   does  Nigeria’s   governance   crisis   seems   to   be  
endemic  and  intractable?  This  paper  seeks  to  address  these  questions  in  six  
 
 
2   Section  4  of   the  Constitution  of   the  Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria,  1999  vests   the   legislative  powers  of   the   federal  and  
state  governments  in  the  legislature.  Beside  this,  legislative  power  is  the  first  in  the  order  of  listing  of  the  Powers  of  the  
Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria  in  the  Constitution.  Sections  80-­89  and  120-­129,  empower  the  legislatures  at  the  federal  and  





sections.   Aside   from   this   introduction,   the   second   section   addresses   the   methodology   while   section   three  
discusses   the  place  of   impeachment   in   the  presidential  system.  Section   four  discusses   the  characteristics  of  
the   Nigerian   political   elites,   while   section   five   discusses   the   legislature   and   the   burden   of   accountability   in  
Nigeria.   Section   six   discusses   impeachment   in   Nigeria’s   political   system   where   some   of   the   cases   of  
impeachment  in  the  Second  and  Fourth  Republics  are  analysed.  In  section  seven,  we  present  and  discuss  the  
data  on  a  number  of  infractions  committed  by  some  governors.  
 
Methodology   
The  paper  adopts  the  qualitative  method,  which  enables  ‘an  interpretive,  naturalistic  approach  to  the  world’  (Denzin  &  
Lincoln,  2011,  p.  3).  In  other  words,  data  evolves  from  natural  settings,  with  a  view  to  making  sense  of  or  interpreting  
phenomena  in  terms  of  the  meanings  people  bring  to  them.  This  method  is  useful  in  delineating  some  of  the  essential  
qualities  of  complex  social  phenomena  like  governance  crisis  and  the  interplay  of  power  in  institutional  structures  of  
government.   Institutional   issues   like  power,  authority,  conflict,   ‘involve   intricate  webs  of  causes,  effects,  processes,  
and  dynamics:  they  are  about  qualities’  (Dougherty,  2002,  p.  894).   
The  paper   relies  on  data   from  extant   literature  and  empirical   evidence  of   corruption  by  government  
officials  in  Nigeria’s  presidential  system.  Data  presented  is  generated  mostly  from  newspaper  reports  on  
the  various  degrees  of  corruption  cases3.  These  reports  are  reliable  because  they  are  either  confessional  
statements  of  the  affected  officials  as  well  as  records  of  judicial  proceedings  resulting  from  investigations.  
 
Impeachment  in  a  Presidential  System   
Inquiry   into   the   role   of   impeachment   requires   an   analysis   of   the   horizon   and   design   of   a   presidential  
system.   Presidentialism   is   an   unusual   form   of   democracy   and   a   derivative   of   the  monarchical   system  
(Ahrens   2001;;   Scheuerman   2005).   In   a   presidential   system,   the   head   of   state   has   a   pre-­established  
tenure  that  the  legislature  cannot  discharge  by  a  parliamentary  vote  (Sartori  1994;;  Linz  1994;;  Perez-­Linan  
2007;;  2014;;  Samuels  and  Shugart  2010).  Most  of  the  modern  presidential  constitutions  
 
 
3   Newspaper  reports  in  Nigeria  constitute  a  reliable  means  of  generating  data  on  the  pandemic  corruption  in  the  political  system.  
The  Freedom  of  Information  Law  has  strengthened  the  Nigerian  media  to  obtain  official  information  and  data  from  government  
offices   and   departments.   Nigerian   media   are   whistle   blowers   in   exposing   corruption   practices   in   government.   Nigerian  
newspapers   report  cases  of  corrupt  practices  daily  while  commentators  as  well  as   the  citizens  voice   their  condemnation  and  
resentments.  Unfortunately,  the  reportage  of  such  unethical  practices  has  not  reduced  the  scourge  because  of  official  cover-­up  
of  such  cases,  especially  at  the  judiciary  (Fagbadebo,  2007).  The  rage  of  public  outcry  against  such  acts  cannot  be  sustained  
once  there  is  a  judicial  pronouncement  or  inaction  by  the  legislature.  The  anti-­corruption  agencies  are  underfunded  to  prosecute  
landmark   cases   of   graft   against   government   officials;;   consequently,   such   cases   linger   in   the   judiciary.   This   becomes  
problematic  when  the  cases  affect  prominent  political  office  holders  or  impinge  on  their  core  interests.  This  has  strengthened  the  




epitomise  the  notion  of  separation  of  powers  and  the  doctrine  of  checks  and  balances  (Hochstetler  2011).  
In  essence,  a  shared  power  is  a  design  to  overcome  the  danger  of  concentration  of  power  in  an  individual  
associated  with  absolute  monarchy.  One  of  the  main  concerns  of  a  presidential  system  is  how  to  curb  the  
abuse  of  these  separated  powers  and  punish  elected  officials  involved  in  misconduct  (Kada  2002).  One  of  
the  mechanisms  to  mitigate  the  abuse  of  power  is  the  legislative  authority  to  remove  an  erring  executive  
through  the  impeachment  process.  
 
Kim.  (2008),  in  his  study  of  some  Latin  American  countries,  has  discovered  that  impeachment  cases  are  common  
in  the  presidential  systems  with  divided  government,  fragmented  political  parties  and  power  imbalance  between  the  
legislature   and   the   executive.   To   him,   public   discontent   about   government   over   poor   economic   performance   and  
scandals   of   misconduct   by   the   leaders   often   propels   lawmakers   to   press   impeachment   charges.   In   other   words,  
legislature   responds   to   the   demands   and   preferences   of   the   public,   who   are   usually   encouraged   by   the   existing  
political  environment,  and  this  often  motivates  impeachment  cases.   
Naoko  Kada  (2002,  p.  2)  recognises  the  importance  of  impeachment  as  an  ‘accountability  mechanism’  in  the  face  
of   the   bourgeoning   corruption   pandemic.   She   notes   the   possibilities   of   abuse   of   the   impeachment   provisions,  
especially  by  the  opposition  groups  in  the  legislature.  This,  she  argues,  depends  ‘largely  on  the  degree  and  nature  of  
information  control  during  investigation’  (Kada,  2002,  p.1).  Her  study  does  not  account  for  the  prevalence  of  brazen  
disregard  for  the  rule  of  law  in  the  face  of  overwhelming  evidence  of  financial  impropriety  as  found  among  top  political  
office  holders   in  Nigeria.  Why   is   it  difficult   for   the  Nigerian   legislature   to  appropriate   the  constitutional  provisions   to  
arrest  the  worsening  accountability  problem?  
 
Political  Elites  in  Nigeria’s  Presidential  System   
  
Scholars  have  argued  that  the  behaviour  of  political  elites  is  crucial  to  democratic  stability,  especially  in  transitional  
political  systems  (Lopez-­Pintor  1987;;  Malloy  1987).  In  other  words,  elite  choices  determine  the  nature  of  democratic  
transitions  and  breakdowns.  The  decision  of   the  actors   to  exercise   their  power   to  stimulate  good  governance  and  
stability  is  a  function  of  choice.  Political  elites,  especially  those  in  the  legislature,  mostly  discover  this  impulse  to  act  
in  the  course  of  their  oversight  function.  As  in  the  case  of  some  Latin  American  countries,  public  protests  against  the  
government  often  compel  the  legislature  to  exercise  its  power  of  discipline  (Kada  2002  and  2003;;  Hochstetler  2011).  
 
In  Nigeria,  scholars  and  writers  are  of  the  views  that  the  defining  nature  of  the  characteristics  of  the  political  elites  is  
abuse  of  power.  Henry  Kifordu  (2011)  says  Nigeria’s  political  actors  depend   largely  on  state  resources  for  survival.  
He  contends   that   they  exploit  and  manipulate  state   institutions   for   the   realisation  of   their  personal  ambitions,  while  
vested   interests   continually   encumber   accountability   (Kifordu,   2010).   Richard   Sklar   and   his   colleagues   aver   that  
‘Nigeria’s  political  titans  vie  for  power  and  control  over  the  vast  spoils  of  office’  and  ‘sit  atop  vast,  pyramid-­structured  





over   70   percent   of   the   people  wallow   in   poverty   (Sklar   et   al,   2006,   p.   105).  Wale   Adebanwi   and   Ebenezer  
Obadare   (2011)   see   Nigeria   as   a   polity   where   political   actors   consecrate   corruption   while   they   engage   in  
competitive   thievery  of   public   funds.  The  next   section  presents   the  evidence   to   support   this   assertion   in   the  
contemporary  dispensation.  
 
The   Nigerian   elites   are   more   interested   in   the   pursuit   of   their   desired   objectives   in   abeyance   to  
constitutional  rules.  Richard  Sklar,  et  al  (2006,  p.100)  remarks:  ‘The  great  game  of  politics  in  Nigeria  is  
perilously   rough   and   at   times   lawless’.   This   describes   the   character   of   the   Nigerian   political   elites.  
Powerful   ‘godfathers’   who   sit   atop   vast   patronage   networks   at   the   local,   state,   and   federal   levels  
dominate   the   country’s   political   landscape.   Political   outcomes   are   primarily   a   function   of   titanic  
struggles   among   these   magnates,   who   bargain   among   themselves   –   and   at   the   expense   of   the  
impoverished  greater  public  –  within  a  political  context  of  multiple  ethno  religious  divisions  (Sklar,  et  al,  
2006,  p.  101).  
 
Because   of   the   prevailing   survival   instinct   (Kew,   2005),   political   elites   seek   all   avenues   to   exert  
control  on  state  power.  
 
Legislature  and  the  Burden  of  Accountability  in  
Nigeria’s  Presidential  System  
  
 
The  legislative  branch  as  the  representative  body  of  the  people  plays  a  vital  role  in  governance  because  it  
performs   important   functions  that  are  necessary  to  sustain  democracy   in  complex  and  diverse  societies  
(Huneeus  et   al.   2006;;  Alabi   2009).  Why   then   is   it   that   an  accountability   problem  pervades   the  political  
system?  Accountability  means   ‘obligation   to  answer   for   the  performance  of  duties’   (Mulgan,  2011,  p  1).  
This  goes  beyond  mere  information  but  includes  the  capacity  to  impose  sanctions  for  failure  or  abuse  of  
responsibilities   as   a   measure   of   remedy   with   a   view   to   rectifying   the   governance   failure   through  
deterrence  (Mulgan,  2011).   
Guillermo   O’Donnell   (2008)   identifies   two   types   of   accountability:   horizontal   and   vertical.   Vertical  
accountability  represents  the  exercise  of   the  voting  power  of   the  citizens  to  change  leaders  through  the  
electoral  process.  Jacobson  (1989)  has  argued  that  a  prevailing  culture  of  free  and  competitive  election  is  
sufficient  motivation   for  political   leaders   to  govern   responsibly.  Nevertheless,  when   the  outcomes  of  an  
election  have  no  bearing  with   the  performance  of  political   elites  while   in  office,   then   the  executive  and  
legislative  elites  might  choose  to  act  irresponsibly  (Jacobson,  1989)4.  
 
 
4   In  developed  democracies,  election  remains  a  veritable  tool  to  hold  political  leaders  accountable.  Leaders  in  such  countries  realise  the  
importance  of  people’s  power   through  voting  and  as  such  pursue  policies  capable  of  placing   them   in   the  good   records  of   the  public.  
Unlike  developing  countries  where  peoples’  votes  rarely  count,  vertical  accountability   in  consolidated  democracies  provides  opposition  




Horizontal   accountability,5   on   the   other   hand,   occurs   in   between   elections   through   institutional  
measures  and  mechanisms  (Mulgan  2011;;  O’Donnell,  2008).  The  state  institution  such  as  the  legislature  
as  well  as  other  bodies  and  agencies  charged  with  the  responsibility  of  conducting  oversight  activities  on  
government   administrations,   exercise   horizontal   accountability.   Such   institutions   have   the   requisite  
powers   and   authority   ‘to   take   actions   that   span   from   routine   oversight   to   criminal   sanctions   or  
impeachment  in  relation  to  actions  or  omissions  by  other  institutions  of  the  state  that  may  be  qualified  as  
unlawful’  (O’Donnell,  2008).   
In  a  presidential  system,  the  legislature  has  the  requisite  constitutional  authority  to  hold  the  executive  
arm  accountable  (Adamolekun  2010).  Indeed,  the  concept  of  separation  of  power  and  doctrine  of  checks  
and   balances   are   structural   designs   to   ensure   the   promotion   of   transparency   and   accountability   in  
government.   With   the   exercise   of   oversight   power   in   a   system   of   separated   but   shared   power,   the  
legislature  seeks  to  scrutinise  government  policies  with  a  view  to  ensuring  effective  service  delivery.   
Central   to   accountability   are   the   measures   for   correction   to   avert   adverse   consequences.   This,  
accountability  mechanisms  such  as  parliamentary  oversight  and  media  investigations  require  the  capacity  
to   impose  sanctions  by   the   relevant  agencies  without  breaching  extant   rules.  The  Nigerian  presidential  
constitution  recognises  the   legislature  as  the  principal   institution  responsible   for  enforcing  accountability  
of  the  executive  branch.   
One   of   the   constitutional   instruments   designed   to   promote   the   culture   of   accountability   is   the  
legislative   power   to   control   and   discipline   the   leadership   of   the   executive   branch.   In   Nigeria,   the  
constitution  recognises  the  importance  of  the  legislature  in  policy  process.  Sections  80-­89  and  120-­1296,  
empower   the   federal   and   state   legislatures,   respectively,   to   control   public   funds.   Section   120   (1&2)  
specifies  that  all  the  resources  of  the  state  should  be  pooled  together  as  a  Consolidated  Revenue  Fund  
(CRF).   Section   120   (3&4)   stipulates   that   withdrawal   from   the   CRF   requires   the   authorisation   of   the  
legislature.  Such  authorisation  is  tied  to  specific  projects  as  reflected  in  the  appropriation  law.  Section  124  
empowers  the  legislature  to  fix  the  remuneration  of  all  political  officeholders,   including  the  governor  and  
his  deputy.  As  a  measure  to  ensure  legislative  control  of  the  finances  of  the  state,  section  125  stipulates  
the  annual  audit  of   the  accounts  of   the  state  by   the  Auditor-­General,  who   is  directly   responsible   to   the  
legislature.   
Of  particular  interest  to  this  paper  is  the  power  assigned  to  the  legislature  to  have  oversight  over  




5   Adamolekun  (2010)   identifies  diagonal  and  the  society-­drawn  horizontal  accountability.  The  diagonal  accountability,  according  
to  him,  connotes  the  involvement  of  the  citizens  directly  in  enforcing  horizontal  
accountability.   
6   These  sections  provide  the  same  items  for  legislative  actions.  This  paper  will  refer  to  sections  120-­129  that  deals  with  the  
legislative  powers  of  the  state  legislature  to  control  public  expenditures.   

(1)   Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Constitution,  a  House  of  Assembly  shall  have  power  by  resolution  published  in  its  
journal   or   in   the   Office   Gazette   of   the   Government   of   the   State   to   direct   or   cause   to   be   directed   an   inquiry   or  
investigation  into  –  (a)  any  matter  or  thing  with  respect  to  which  it  has  power  to  make  laws;;  and  (b)  the  conduct  of  
affairs  of  any  person,  authority,  ministry  or  government  department  charged,  or  intended  to  be  charged,  with  the  duty  
of  or  responsibility  for  –  (i)  Executing  or  administering  laws  enacted  by  that  House  of  Assembly,  and  (ii)  Disbursing  or  
administering  moneys  appropriated  or  to  be  appropriated  by  such  House.  (2)  The  powers  conferred  on  a  House  of  
Assembly  under   the  provisions  of   this  section  are  exercisable  only   for   the  purpose  of  enabling   the  House   to  –   (a)  
Make  laws  with  respect  to  any  matter  within  its  legislative  competence  and  correct  any  defects  in  existing  laws;;  and  
(b)   Expose   corruption,   inefficiency   of   waste   in   the   execution   or   administration   of   laws   within   its   legislative  
competence   and   in   the   disbursement   or   administration   of   funds   appropriated   by   it   (Constitution   of   the   Federal  
Republic  of  Nigeria,  1999  (as  amended).  
 
Inherent   in   this  provision   is   the  authority  of   the   legislature   to  exert   its  control  over   the  executive   in  
terms  of  sanctions  and  discipline  to   induce  accountability.   Impeachment   is  one  such  accountability  
measure.  
 
Impeachment  in  Nigeria’s  Presidential  System   
Section   188   of   the   19997   constitution   of   Nigeria   set   out   the   procedure   for   the   removal   of   a  
governor/deputy   governor   of   a   state8.   Impeachment   denotes   indictment   of   misconduct.   Henry  
Campbell  Black  defines  it  in  the  United  States  as:  
 
A  criminal  proceeding  against  a  public  officer,  before  a  quasi  political  court,   instituted  by  a  written  
accusation   called   ‘articles   of   impeachment’;;   for   example,   a   written   accusation   by   the   House   of  
Representatives  of   the  United  States   to   the  Senate  of   the  United  States  against  an  officer  (Black  
1968,  p886).   
 
 
7   In  the  1979  constitution,  the  first  presidential  constitution,  this  provision  is  contained  in  section  132,  for  the  removal  of  the  president/vice-­
president   and   section   170   for   the   removal   of   a   governor/deputy-­governor.   The   difference   between   the   provisions   is   that   in   the   1979  
constitution,  the  process  begins  and  ends  with  the   
legislature,  while  the  1999  provisions  involve  the  Chief  Judge  to  set  up  the  panel  to  investigate  the  allegation  of  gross  misconduct.   
8   A   similar   procedure   for   the   removal   of   the   president/vice-­president   is   in   section   143.   In   the   entire   provision   for   removal   of   a  
governor/deputy-­governor,  president/deputy-­president,  there  is  no  use  of  the  word  ‘impeachment’.  The  word  appears  in  six  places  in  the  
constitution.   In  sections  84  (5)  and  124  (5),   impeachment   is  mentioned  in  respect  of  disqualification  for  pension  by  the  president/vice-­
president  and  governor/deputy-­governor,   respectively.  Sections  146  (1)  &  3(a)  and  191  (1)  &3(a),   identify   impeachment  as  one  of   the  
factors   that   can   disqualify   the   president/vice-­president   and   governor/deputy-­governor,   respectively,   from   continuing   in   office.   The  





This   definition   differs   from   the   impression   in   the   Nigerian   constitution.   In   this   paper,   I   use  
impeachment   to   denote   the   removal   of   a   governor/deputy-­governor   and   president/vice-­president  
through  a  legislative  process.  
   
Article   II   section  4  of   the  US  constitution  stipulates   the  offences   that   could  warrant   impeachment   to  
include  treason,  bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  and  misdemeanours  (The  Constitution  of  the  United  States).  
Section   188(2b)   of   the   Nigerian   constitution   defines   the   offence   that   could   warrant   the   removal   of   a  
governor/deputy-­governor   to   be   ‘gross   misconduct   in   the   performance   of   the   functions   of   his   office’  
(Constitution   of   the   Federal   Republic   of   Nigeria,   1999,   as   amended).   Section   188(11)   defines   gross  
misconduct  to  mean  ‘a  grave  violation  or  breach  of  the  provisions  of  this  Constitution  or  a  misconduct  of  
such  nature  as  amounts,   in  the  opinion  in  the  House  of  Assembly,  to  gross  misconduct’  (Constitution  of  
the  Federal  Republic  of  Nigeria,  1999  as  amended).   
  
This  definition  has  been  subjected  to  a  series  of  abuse  and  misuse  by  the  Nigerian  state  legislatures  
(Nwabueze  1985;;  Lawan  2010).  Nwabueze  (1985)  averred  that  this  definition  represents  a  misconception  
of  the  original  meaning  of  gross  misconduct.  The  Supreme  Court  has  described  it  as  ‘nebulous,  fluid  and  
subject  to  potentially  gross  abuse  and  is  also  potentially  dangerous  at  this  point  of  our  national  or  political  
life’  (Inakoju  &  17  Ors  v.  Adeleke  &  3  Ors).9  The  Supreme  Court  admitted  that  though  section  188(11)  ‘is  
generic  and  vague  in  its  wording  [but]  cannot  be  extended  beyond  its  onerously  generic  and  vague  nature  
to  include  misconduct,  which  are  not  gross’  (Inakoju  &  17  Ors  v.  Adeleke  &  3  Ors)10.  The  Court  thereafter  
defined  gross  conduct  as  grave  violation  of  the  constitution  such  as  corruption,  breach  of  the  provisions,  
abuse  of  fiscal  provisions  as  well  as  interference  with  the  statutory  functions  of  the  legislature.   
Similarly,   section  188(10),  which  ousts   judicial   intervention   in   the   impeachment  procedure,  has  also  
been  misconceived  by   the   judiciary   to  mean  blanket   restraint   of   judicial   review  of   impeachment   cases.  
The   Supreme   Court   also   averred   that   the   interpretation   of   the   clause   of   the   provision   negates   the  
intendment  of  the  drafters  of  the  constitution11.  The  apex  court  submits  that  the  judiciary  cannot  interfere  
with   the  decision  of   the   legislature  but  can   judicially  consider   the  extent  of  compliance   to   the  stipulated  
rule  and  procedure  for  impeachment  (Inakoju  &  17  Ors  v.  Adeleke  &  3  Ors).12   
Essentially,   the   import   of   impeachment   in   the   Nigerian   constitution   is   to   serve   as   an   instrument   of  
accountability.  Ben  Nwabueze  (1985)  sees  impeachment  as  an  instrument  of  check  against  gross  official  
misconduct.  Drawing  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  American  presidential  system,  Nwabueze  argues  that  the  
provision  is  not  a  means  of  controlling  the  tenure  of  the  officials  concerned  but  to  ensure  ethical  conduct  
in  the  exercise  of  power13.  Awotokun  (1998)  sees  the  provisions  as  the  
 
 
9   Inakoju  &  17  Ors  v.  Adeleke  &  3  Ors  (2007)  1  S.  C.  (Pt  I),  p183.    
10  Inakoju  &  17  Ors  v.  Adeleke  &  3  Ors  (2007)  1  S.  C.  (Pt  I),  p135.    
11  Inakoju  &  17  Ors  v.  Adeleke  &  3  Ors,  (2007)  1  S.  C.  (pt  I),  p  75  12  Inakoju  &  17  Ors  v.  
Adeleke  &  3  Ors,  (2007)  1  S.  C(pt  I))  
13  Impeachment  is  like  the  use  of  a  vote  of  no  confidence  in  the  parliamentary  system.  While  a  vote  of  no  confidence  signifies  the  
fall  of  the  government,  impeachment  only  affects  the  tenure  of  the  officeholder  without  affecting  the  government.  Perez-­Linan  
(2007)  discusses  this  point  in  detail,  arguing  that  impeachment  is  an  instrument  of  correction  to  discontinue  with  a  particular  administration  




needed   mechanisms   to   enhance   accountability,   probity,   and   responsible   executive   with   a   view   to   averting  
arbitrariness   in   the  exercise  of   power.   In   other  words,   impeachment   is   the  antidote   to   corruption  associated  
with   absolute   power.   Akinsanya   (2002)   argues   that   impeachment   provision   in   the   constitution   is   the   most  
effective  weapon   to  combat   the  excess  abuse  and  misuse  of  state  power  by   the  executive  branch.  To   them,  
impeachment  power  of  the  legislature  is  essential  to  ensure  effective  control  of  the  executive.  
 
Could  this  be  the  intention  of  the  drafters  of  the  constitution?  The  Nigerian  Supreme  Court  answered  
this  in  affirmative:  
 
The  exercise  [impeachment]  is  much  more  than  the  party  the  Governor  or  Deputy  Governor  belongs  to  
and   the   party   a   member   belongs   to.   It   is   an   exercise   for   the   good   of   the   state   and   members   must  
remove   their   political   hats   or   togas…Let   the   debate   and   the   subsequent   findings   of   the   House   be  
donated  by  the  report  of  the  Panel  and  not  by  sentiment  (Inakoju  &  17  Ors  v.  Adeleke  &  3  Ors).14  
 
The   court   stressed   that   impeachment   ‘is   meant   to   guarantee   good   governance   and   development   and   to   prevent  
abuse  of  power’  (Inakoju  &  17  Ors  v.  Adeleke  &  3  Ors).15  In  other  words,  the  impeachment  provision  is  not  meant  to  
exhibit  sectional  or  political  sentiments,  but   is  meant  as  an   instrument   to  ensure   the  promotion  of   the  public  good.  
Why  was  it  difficult  for  the  political  elites  to  appropriate  these  statutory  provisions  as  intended  by  the  constitution?  
 
Impeachment  in  Nigeria’s  Second  Republic  
   
During   the  Second  Republic,   there  was  a  series  of  attempts  by   the   legislature   to  exercise   the   impeachment  
power   in  section  170  of   the  Constitution  (Nwabueze  1985;;  Awotokun  1998;;  Akinsanya  and  Idang  2002).  The  
most   celebrated   was   the   impeachment   of   Balarabe   Musa,   the   governor   of   the   defunct   Kaduna   State.   His  
impeachment  was  a  function  of  the  divided  government  that  characterised  the  Kaduna  state  where  the  national  
Party  of  Nigeria   (NPN)  secured  majority  seats   in   the   legislature,  while   the  Peoples  Redemption  Party   (PRP)  










14   (2007)  1  S.  C.  (Pt  I),  p62.    





The  seemingly   ideological  difference  between  the  NPN  and  PRP16,  coupled  with  the  rigid  position  of  
the  governor,  accentuated  an  acute  and  hostile   relationship  between   the  executive  and   the   legislature.  
Rather  than  adopt  a  negotiated  path  of  compromise  and  accommodation  of  the  opposition,  the  governor’s  
intransigent   and   hostile   disposition   was   reflected   in   his   maiden   address   where   he   outlined   the   policy  
direction  of  his  government17   (Awotokun,  1998).  This   radical  posture   infuriated   the  NPN  members,  who  
were   in   the  majority   in   the   legislature.  The   lawmakers  were  of   the   view   that   the  governor   should  have  
consulted   with   the   House   on   such   a   sweeping   policy   statement.   Despite   this   criticism,   the   governor  
insisted  that  he  would  not  reach  a  compromise  with  the  NPN  majority  legislators.  The  deadlock  eventually  
paved  the  way   for  breaches  of  constitutional  provisions   in   the  exercise  of   the  governor’s  power  with  an  
uncompromising  legislature.   
It   is  evident  that  the  attitude  of  the  legislature  is  more  politics  than  policy.  The  lawmakers  seized  the  
majoritarian   opportunity   to   vent   their   political   anger   consequent   upon   the   defeat   of   NPN   in   the  
gubernatorial  election.  The  outcome  of  this  action,  according  to  Nwabueze  (1985),  is  its  bandwagon  effect  
as  other  legislatures  embarked  upon  the  impeachment  of  their  deputy  governors  while  others  threatened  
their  governors  with  the  impeachment  axe.  Unfortunately,  the  judiciary  adopted  a  self-­restraining  posture  
in  adjudicating  cases  of  flagrant  abuse  of  the  procedure  (Nwabueze  1985).  
 
Impeachment  in  the  Fourth  Republic   
Consequent  upon  the  successful  impeachment  of  Balarabe  Musa  without  any  reprieve  from  the  judiciary,  
the   tide  of   impeachment  grew   in   the  early  period  of   the  Fourth  Republic.  The   legislatures   in  Anambra,  
Bayelsa  Ekiti,  Oyo,  and  Plateau   impeached   their  governors.  Similarly,   legislatures   in  Abia,  Akwa   Ibom,  




16   The  NPN  and  PRP  were  offshoots  of  two  major  political  parties  controlling  the  Northern  Nigeria  in  the  First  Republic  –  Northern  Peoples’  
Congress  (NPC)  and  the  Northern  Elements  Progressive  Union  (NEPU).  Mallam  Aminu  Kano,  the  leader  of  NEPU,  was  also  the  founder  
and  leader  of  PRP.  NEPU  prides  itself  on  being  the  party  who  represents  the  interests  of  the  peasantry  in  the  North  as  opposed  to  its  
conception   of   NPC   as   the   mouthpiece   of   the   oligarchy   and   the   bourgeoise   class.   This   radical   ideological   disposition   unsettled   the  
political   situation   in   the   North,   especially   in   Kano,   as   the   NEPU   became   the   rallying   political   platform   for   the   Talakawas   (the   poor  
peasants  who  constitute  the  majority)  (Dudley  1968;;  Sklar  1963).  This  same  orientation  remained  the  platform  upon  which  PRP  emerged  
as  a  political  party  in  the  Second  Republic.  Its  electoral  fortune  was  restricted  to  the  Kano  and  Kaduna  States.    
17   The  governor  condemned  the  existing  social  order  with  a  resolution  that  his  government  would  initiate  the  building  of  a  
new   foundation   of   new   social   order.   As   a   demonstration   of   this   policy   thrust,   the   governor   ordered   the   suspension,  
processing,  and  issuance  of  certificates  of  occupancy  on  government  lands.  To  him,  the  land  allocation  system  was  an  
instrument  of  semi-­feudal  oppression  and  exploitation  in  the  society.  For  the  details  on  this,  see  Musa  1981.  
18   The  Governor  of  the  State  had  earlier  escaped  removal  through  impeachment  because  the  House  could  not  muster  sufficient  votes  to  
direct  the  investigation  of  the  allegations  of  gross  misconduct  contained  in  the  notice.   
 
 
removed  the  Deputy  Governors  of  their  respective  states19.  In  all  these  cases,  there  was  a  series  of  breaches  
of  constitutional  provisions  relating  to  the  procedure  required  by  law.   
Unlike   the   cases  of  Balarabe  Musa  during   the  Second  Republic,   judicial   review  of   the   legislative   actions  
brought  relief  to  three  of  the  four  impeached  governors.  Judicial  pronouncements  nullified  the  impeachment  of  
Governors  Rashidi  Ladoja,  Joshua  Dariye  and  Peter  Obi  of  Oyo,  Plate  and  Anambra  States,  respectively.20  In  
recent   times,   the   legislatures  have  been  guided  by   this   judicial  precedent   though   it  has  not   reduced   the  
rate  at  which  state  legislatures  exercise  the  power  either  to  harass  or  settle  political  scores.   
The  position  of  this  paper  is  that  in  all  the  impeachment  cases  that  took  place  in  the  Fourth  Republic,  
none   have   been   used   for   the   promotion   of   accountability   (Fagbadebo   2010).   The   18lawmakers   who  
participated  in  the  impeachment  of  Governor  Ladoja  in  2006  acted  the  script  of  their  godfather,  Late  Alhaji  
Lamidi  Adedibu  (Omobowale  and  Olutayo,  2007).  Similarly,  the  six  members  of  the  Plateau  State  House  
of  Assembly  who  impeached  the  governor,  Chief  Joshua  Dariye,  acted  upon  the  goading  of  the  Economic  
and   Financial   Crime   Commission   (EFCC)   (Lawan   2010).   Prior   to   this   time,   there   had   been   cases   of  
money  laundering  against  the  governor,  who  had  earlier  jumped  bail  in  London  (Global  Witness,  2010).  In  
Bayelsa  State,  Governor  Diepreye  Alamieyeseigha,  like  Dariye,  absconded  from  London  in  2005,  having  
been  arrested   on   allegations   of  money   laundering   by   the   London  Metropolitan  Police   (Global  Witness,  
2010).  Nevertheless,  the  majority  of  the  legislators  did  not  see  any  reason  for  his  impeachment  until  the  
EFCC  conscripted  15  of  the  24-­member  House  to  commence  the  impeachment  process.  
 
In  2014,   the   legislators   in  Adamawa  State   impeached  the  governor,  Murtala  Nyako,  on  26  counts  of  
financial  misconduct   (Yusuf,   2014).   Prior   to   this   time,   the   EFCC   had   frozen   the   accounts   of   the   state  
government   upon   suspicion   of   fraudulent   transfer   of   state   funds   to   personal   accounts   of   government  
officials   (Alachenu   et   al,   2014).   With   proven   cases   of   financial   malpractices   established   against   the  
governor,  one  could  argue  that  the  legislators  were  prompted  by  their  desire  to  salvage  the  state  from  the  
shackles  of  misgovernment.  Nevertheless,  it  is  evident  that  the  legislators’  actions  were  prompted  by  the  
impulse   to   avenge   the   defection   of   the   governor   from   the   People   Democratic   Party   (PDP)   to   the  
opposition   party,   the   All   Progressive   Congress   (APC)   (ThisDay,   18   July,   2014).   In   October   2013,   the  





19   The   Deputy   Governor   of   Abia   State,   Eyinaya   Abaribe,   survived   the   first   impeachment   attempt   but   eventually   resigned   when   the  
legislature   commenced   the   second   attempt.   Similarly,   the   two  Deputy  Governors   in   Lagos  States,   Bucknor  Akerele   and  Pedro,   also  
tendered  their  resignation   letters  when  the   legislature  commenced  the   impeachment  process  against   them.  Tukur  Jikamshi  of  Katsina  
State,  Abdullahi  Argungu  of  Kebbi  State,  John  Okpa  of  Cross  River  State,  Garba  Gadi  of  Gombe  state  and  Shehu  Kwatalo  of  Jigawa  
State,  lost  their  positions  through  impeachment  when  they  fell  out  with  their  governors.    
20   Inakoju  &  17Ors  v  Adeleke  &  3  Ors[2007]  8  NWLR;;  Hon.  Michael  Dapialong  and  others  v.  Chief  (Dr)  Joshua  Chibi  Dariye  and  another,  
[2007]  8  NWLR;;  Hon.  Mike  Balonwu  &five  others  v.  Mr.  Peter  Obi  &  another  (2007)  5  NWLR  (Pt.1028)  488  C.A.  
of   confidence   on   the   leadership   of   the   governor,   Murtala   Nyako   (Sani,   2014)21.   The   lawmakers   had  
praised  the  governor  for  his  purposeful  leadership  in  the  administration  of  the  government  of  the  state  as  
well   as   forging   an   effective   working   relationship   with   the   legislature.   Curiously,   the   offences   that  
warranted  impeachment  had  been  committed  prior  to  the  time  the  legislators  passed  a  vote  of  confidence  
in   the  governor.   If   the  governor  had  not  defected   from   the  PDP   to   the  APC,  would   the   legislators  have  
contemplated   impeaching  him?  From  all   indications,   it   is  evident   that   the   impeachment  of   the  governor  
was  primarily  prompted  as  an  instrument  of  political  vendetta  rather  than  a  promotion  of  accountability.   
The  Chief  Whip  of   the  Adamawa  State  House  of  Assembly,  Mr  Jerry  Kumdisi,  provided   insights   into  
the   politics   associated   with   the   impeachment   of   the   governor   (Ndiribe,   2014).   According   to   him,   the  
impeachment  of   the  governor  was  a  punishment   for  his  arrogance.  He  disclosed   further   that   the  major  
factor   that   prompted   the   move   was   a   series   of   political   differences   between   the   governor   and   some  
members   of   the   legislature.   Is   impeachment   an   instrument   of   punishment   for   arrogance   or   political  
vendetta?   With   the   exception   of   Peter   Obi,   whose   impeachment   was   orchestrated   by   the   divided-­
government,   the  other   three   impeached  governors  had  cases  of  allegations  of  mismanagement  of  state  
resources   (Lawan,   2010).   Though   judicial   review   of   their   cases   was   not   based   on   the   veracity   of   the  
allegations,  it  is  evident  from  later  developments  that  they  were  actually  culpable  of  gross  misconduct.  As  
shown   in   data   presentation,   these   former   governors   are   currently   involved   in   judicial   litigation   over   the  
allegations  of  financial  impropriety  while  in  office.  Aside  from  this,  there  are  other  governors  who  are  also  
involved  in  litigation  over  financial  impropriety  while  in  office  but  are  not  ‘harassed’  or  threatened  by  their  
legislatures.  
  
Extant  constitutional  provisions  provide  avenues  to  monitor   the  disbursement  of  government  funds.  The  
legislature   has   constitutional   powers   to   police   the   administration   of   appropriated   funds.  With   adequate  
constitutional  provisions,  there  should  not  be  cases  of  misapplication  or  embezzlement  of  public  funds  at  
any   level   of   government   in   Nigeria.   Nevertheless,   empirical   evidence,   as   presented   below,   shows   a  
prevailing   culture   of   impunity   among   the   heads   of   the   executives   of   the   states   vis-­à-­vis   failure   of   their  
respective  legislatures  to  exercise  their  oversight  power.  The  table  that  follows  shows  records  of  evidence  






21   The  concept  of  a  vote  of  confidence  is  alien  to  the  presidential  system.  It  is  an  instrument  commonly  used  to  confirm  the  
survival  of  a  government   in   the  parliamentary  system.  A  vote  of   ‘no  confidence’   is  an   indication  of   the  collapse  of   the  
government.  However,  its  usage  is  a  common  phenomenon  in  the  Nigerian  presidential  system,  apparently  politically,  as  
an   instrument   of   public   relations,   when   lawmakers   have   struck   a   deal   with   the   governor,   usually   to   do   with   welfare  





Table  1:  Records  of  Allegations  of  Impropriety  against  Selected  Governors  between  1999  and  2011  
    
Name  of   State   Allegations   Legislative/Judicial  Action  
Governor      
Jolly  Nyame   Taraba   Money  laundering  and  acceptance   No  legislative  action.  Charged  in  court  
 1999-­2007   of  bribe  to  the  tune  of  N1.36billion   by  the  EFCC  but  no  conviction  
James  Ibori   Delta   Stole  £50m  while  in  office.   No  legislative  action.  Convicted  by  a  
 1999-­2007   Embezzled  £157million.  Laundered   London  Court  
  £1.4million    
Lucky   Edo   Stole  N4.4  billion   No  legislative  action.  He  was  charged  
Igbinedion   1999-­2007   in  court  by  EFCC  and  found  guilty  
Joshua  Dariye   Plateau   N1.6  billion  of  the  state’s  ecological   No  legislative  action.  EFCC  induced  
 1999-­2007   fund  while  in  office   his  impeachment  but  was  invalidated  
   by  the  judiciary.  He  later  confessed  to  
   the  offence  but  said  that  he  had  used  
   part  of  the  money  to  fund  the  2003  
   presidential  election  
Attahiru   Sokoto   Facing  a  47-­count  charge  relating   No  legislative  action.  EFCC  pressed  
Bafarawa   1999-­2007   to  allegations  of  embezzlement  of   charges  against  him  
  state  funds    
Orji  Uzor  Kalu   Abia   Criminal  diversion  of  public  funds   No  legislative  action.  Was  charged  in  
 1999-­2007   totalling  over  N5  billion   court  by  the  EFCC  
Chimaroke   Enugu   Laundered  N4.5  billion   No  legislative  action.  EFCC  pressed  
Nnamani   1999-­2003   charges  against  him  
Danjuma  Goje   Gombe   Diversion  of  N52  billion  state  funds   No  legislative  action.  EFCC  pressed  
 2003-­2011   for  private  use.  Stole  N5  billion   charges  against  him  
  from  the  state  coffers  through    
  supply  of  food  to  the  Gombe  State   
  Government  House    
Diepreye   Bayelsa   Money  laundering  to  the  tune  of   Impeached  by  a  faction  of  the  
Alamieyeseigha   1999-­2005   over  US  $20million;;  arrested  in   legislature  induced  by  the  EFCC.  
  London  but  absconded  to  Nigeria   Arrested  and  charged  in  court.  He  was  
   found  guilty  but  was  later  pardoned  by  
   the  Federal  Government  
 
Sources:  Compiled  by  the  author  from  different  newspaper  reports.  
 
The  above  data  is  a  reflection  of  the  general  pattern  of  actions  and  modus  operandi  of  most  government  
officials   in   Nigeria.   While   in   office,   in   spite   of   the   constitutional   provisions   for   checks,   the   culture   of  
impunity   characterises   the   administration   of   governance.   Most   of   these   governors,   despite   the  
overwhelming   evidence   of   graft   while   in   government,   are   serving   in   various   capacities   in   the   National  






are  serving  senators  in  the  Nigerian  Senate.  In  fact,  Bafarawa  was,  at  a  time,  contemplating  running  
for  the  Nigerian  presidency.   
While  these   indicted  former  governors  remain  prominent  actors   in  the  country’s  political  process,   the  
anti-­corruption  agencies   find   it  difficult   to  proceed  with   their  prosecution   for   lack  of   funds.  For   instance,  
the  EFCC  had  to  make  provision  for  N284.6  million  in  the  2014  budget  for  the  prosecution  of  the  former  
governors   indicted  of  corruption  since  2003  (Daniel  2014)!  This   is  an  indication  of  the  prevalence  of  the  
culture  of  impunity  while  the  legislature  remains  docile.   
The  provisions  of   the  constitution  on   the  power  of   the  state   legislature   to  discipline  erring  governors  
are  clear.  While  the  legislature  recognises  impeachment  as  an  oversight  function  to  instil  fiscal  discipline  
and  promote  good  governance   in   the   country’s   presidential   system,   (Tambuwal,   2013)   its   conduct   and  
reactions  to  cases  of  corrupt  practices  left  much  to  be  desired.  A  writer  sums  it  up  this  way:  
 
A   situation   where   legislators   are   sitting   contractors   does   not   only   worsen   the   situation   but   result(s)   in   conflict   of  
interest  between  public  interest  and  private  concern.  Where  ministries,  parastatals  and  other  organizations  that  are  
supposed  to  be  under  the  ‘supervision’  of  the  legislature  end  up  sponsoring,  paying  for  the  over  sea  (sic)  trips  and  
other   emoluments   of   the   legislature,   oversight   functions   automatically   take   the   passenger’s   seat   if   not   outrightly  
thrown  out  of  the  fast-­moving  vehicle  of  national  development  (Kadir,  ND).  
 
Unfortunately,  none  of   the  state   legislatures  of   these  governors   took  any  action  while   the  governors  were   in  
office,   with   the   exception   of   Alamieyeseigha.   Thus,   accountability   is   not   a   direct   consequence   of   collusion  
between  the  executive  and  the  legislature.   
The  political  elites  blame   this   failure  on   the  absence  of  credible   leadership   in   the  political  system  (Ajayi,  2013).  
Former  president  Olusegun  Obasanjo  said  that  the  country  is  reeling  under  the  curse  of   leadership  (Ajayi,  2013).  A  
former  defence  minister,  Theophilus  Danjuma,  denounced  the  infamous  role  of  the  country’s  political  leadership,  who  
were   fond   of   ‘scheming   and   screaming   for   due   and   undue   advantages’   while   the   people   ‘are   chained   down   in  
dehumanising  and  grinding  poverty’(cf.  Akhaine  &  Bello,  2013).  The  legislature  lamented  the  failure  of  governance  as  
the  Senate  President,  David  Mark,  spotted  ‘frustrations  occasioned  by  maladministration’  as  the  lot  of  the  people  of  
the  country  (cf.  Aborisade,  2013).  To  him,  the  rising  tide  of   insecurity  and  serial  political   instability,  especially  within  
the  political  parties,  depicted  the  unbridled  appetite  of  the  leadership  for  power  without  service.  
 
We  need  to  look  inwards  and  begin  to  search  our  minds.  The  ball  certainly  is  in  our  court  as  leaders  to  do  what  
we  should  do  to  reverse  the  trend.  We  must  shelve  the  attitude  of  seeking  power  at  all  cost(s).  We  do  not  need  







These  submissions  manifest  in  the  spate  of  failure  that  characterises  the  provision  of  basic  amenities  in  
the  country.  Most  Nigerian  roads  are  in  deplorable  condition  while  many  communities  are  under  the  siege  
of  criminals.  Transparency  and  accountability  are  no  longer  the  norms  guiding  public  policy.  Every  sector  
of   the  society  has  its  own  device  of  circumventing  the  rules  of  probity.   In  short,   the  spoil  politics  and  its  
attendant   effects   are   the   defining   characters   of   every   sector   in   the   Nigerian   society   where   access   to  
political  power   is   the  avenue   to  appropriate  state   resources   for  personal  prosperity   (Dal  Bo  and  Powell  
2009).  The  outcome  of  this  is  the  acute  struggle  to  control  state  power  by  the  political  elite.  While  private  
properties  of  the  political  elites  expand,  the  people’s  quality  of  life  dwindles.  
 
Conclusion   
The  urge  of   the  people   to  abandon   their   legitimate  place  of  assignment  where   ‘they  could  only  make  a  
pittance’  and  accept  ‘the  cozy,  cushy  embrace  of  a  corrupt,  deceitful,  and  unscrupulous…  administration’  
(Obasanjo,  1998)22  persists.  Indeed,  Obasanjo’s  description  of  Nigeria  as  a  country  where  ‘anything  goes’  
is   more   real   under   civilian   administration   since   May   29,   1999   characterised   by   spoils.   In   Nigeria,  
‘corruption   and   fraud   became   habits   that   trickled   down   to   every   level   of   society’   (Obasanjo,   1998).  
President  Goodluck  Jonathan  recently  admitted  that  the  Nigerian  people  have  accepted  corruption  as  the  
norm  with  a  retrogressive  system  through  which  the  society  rewards  corrupt  people,  rather  than  punishes  
them  (Ujah,  2013).  
 
When  you  talk  about  corruption,   the  private  sector   is   involved;;   the  public  sector   is   involved;;  even  
the  individuals,  including  other  societies,  and  I  wouldn’t  want  to  mention  names  so  that  I  will  not  be  
attacked.   But   I   know   that   if   collectively   all   of   us   don’t   reward   corruption,   people   would   not   be  
attracted  to  corrupt  practices,  but  when  we  all  reward  corruption,  then  of  course,  we  will  be  tempted  
to  go  in  that  direction  (cf.  Ujah,  2013).  
 
In  other  words,  the  Nigerian  environment,  according  to  the  president,  tempts  government  officials  to  take  
what  belongs  to  the  public.  This  is  an  admission  of  failure  by  a  leader  who  swore  to  uphold  the  provisions  
of  the  constitution  of  the  country.   
All   the   above   submissions   by   political   elites   are   indications   of   the   failure   of   presidentialism   as   a  
governing  system  meant  for  the  promotion  and  protection  of  the  interests  of  the  public  in  Nigeria.  This  is  
not  necessarily  because  of  the  nature  of  the  system,  but  the  endemic  culture  of  corruption  that  pervades  
the   political   landscape   of   the   country.   Thus,   it   is   obvious   that   with   systemic   corruption,   governing  
measures   to   induce  good  governance  would  be  an  exercise   in   futility.  And   impeachment  will   remain  an  




22   Olusegun  Obasanjo,  a  one-­time  military  head  of  state  and  lately  the  democratically  elected  president  for  eight  years,  used  these  
words   to   deride   the   nature   of   political   actors   under   the  military   regime   of   general   Ibrahim   Babangida,   ironically,   one   of   the  
prominent   elites   in   the   ruling   People   Democratic   Party   (PDP).   These   words   are   still   relevant   to   describe   the   nature   of   the  
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